Major Questions About the  Major Questions  Doctrine by Leske, Kevin O.
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law 
Volume 5 Issue 2 
2016 
Major Questions About the "Major Questions" Doctrine 
Kevin O. Leske 
Barry University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of 
the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the "Major Questions" Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479 
(2016). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol5/iss2/4 
 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative 
Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-2\MEA204.txt unknown Seq: 1 18-MAY-16 12:58
MAJOR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE “MAJOR
QUESTIONS” DOCTRINE
Kevin O. Leske*
After over a decade of hibernation, the United States Supreme Court has
awoken the “major questions” doctrine, which has re-emerged in an expanded
form. Under the doctrine, a court will not defer to an agency’s interpretation of a
statutory provision in circumstances where the case involves an issue of deep
economic or political significance or where the interpretive question could effectu-
ate an enormous and transformative expansion of the agency’s regulatory
authority.
While the doctrine’s re-emergence in recent Supreme Court cases has already
raised concerns, a subtle shift in its application has gone unnoticed. Unlike in
earlier cases, where the Court invoked the major questions doctrine under Step
One of the Chevron framework, the Court has recently applied the doctrine in
other stages of the Chevron analysis.
For instance, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the Court first
found that the statutory provision at issue was ambiguous under Chevron Step
One. It then raised the major questions doctrine as part of its Step Two analysis
to find that the agency’s interpretation was unreasonable. In stark contrast, the
Court in King v. Burwell invoked the major questions doctrine at Chevron
Step Zero and thereby declined to apply the Chevron framework altogether.
The re-emergence of the major questions doctrine and its expanded applica-
tion is significant and raises doctrinal and pragmatic concerns. Accordingly, this
Essay seeks to re-introduce the doctrine to the legal community and explain the
Court’s recent application of the doctrine to demonstrate how and why its new-
found scope warrants further study.
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INTRODUCTION
After over a decade of hibernation, the United States Supreme Court
has awoken the “major questions” doctrine, which has re-emerged in an ex-
panded form. Under the doctrine, a court will not defer to an agency’s in-
terpretation of a statutory provision in circumstances where the case
involves an issue of deep economic or political significance or where the
interpretive question could effectuate an enormous and transformative ex-
pansion of the agency’s regulatory authority.
While the doctrine’s re-emergence in recent Supreme Court cases has
already raised concerns, a subtle shift in its application has gone unnoticed.
Unlike in earlier cases, where the Court invoked the major questions doc-
trine under Step One of the Chevron framework,1 the Court has recently
applied the major questions doctrine in other stages of the Chevron analysis.
For instance, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA2 (UARG), the Court
first found that the statutory provision at issue was ambiguous under Chev-
ron Step One. It then raised the major questions doctrine as part of its Step
Two analysis to find that the agency’s interpretation was unreasonable.3 In
stark contrast, the Court in King v. Burwell invoked the major questions
doctrine at Chevron Step Zero and thereby declined to apply the Chevron
framework altogether.4
But why should we be concerned with both the return and expansion in
the application of the major questions doctrine? In short, there are prag-
matic, doctrinal, and constitutional problems with the doctrine. These con-
cerns range from the shift of interpretive authority from agencies (thereby
raising separation of power issues) to practical problems with having courts
determine what constitutes a “major question.” And now the substantial
concerns are back in play with the appearance of the major questions doc-
1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439–42 (2014).
3. Id. at 2442–44. The “major questions” doctrine is also referred to by scholars as the
“great questions” doctrine or canon or the “major questions exception.” See, e.g., Abigail R.
Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of
Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593 (2008).
Interestingly, however, the Court itself does not use a particular name to identify the
doctrine.
4. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
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trine in recent Supreme Court cases. Accordingly, this Essay seeks to re-
introduce this doctrine to the legal community and explain the Court’s re-
cent application of the doctrine to demonstrate how and why its newfound
scope warrants further study.
Part I begins by briefly reviewing the Chevron doctrine, which repre-
sents the foundation of statutory construction cases involving agency inter-
pretations. Part II explains the “major questions” doctrine and its genesis as
a canon before the U.S. Supreme Court. Part III then explores the recent
cases in which the Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine. It also analyzes
the significance of the re-emergence and expansion in the application of the
doctrine. The Essay concludes by outlining pragmatic, doctrinal, and consti-
tutional problems with the major questions doctrine to highlight why its re-
appearance calls for careful attention moving forward.
I. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.
A. The Chevron Two-Step
This Part offers a brief introduction to the Supreme Court’s deference
regime under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resource Defense Council, Inc.5
Because the background facts and holding in Chevron are familiar, they will
be only cursorily described here.
The Court in Chevron was required to interpret the meaning of “statio-
nary source” as that term was used in the Clean Air Act (CAA).6 Under its
CAA authority, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enacted
a regulation that permitted states “to adopt a plantwide definition of the
term ‘stationary source.’ ”7 Under this definition, a facility could install or
modify specific pollution-generating units at a plant without triggering on-
erous permit conditions, as long as the modification did not increase plant-
wide emissions.8
The question presented, as set forth by the Court, was whether EPA’s
decision to group all pollution-generating units “as though they were en-
cased within a single ‘bubble’ [was] based on a reasonable construction of
the statutory term ‘stationary source.’ ”9 Writing for a unanimous 6-0
Court, Justice John Paul Stevens found that EPA’s regulation was reasona-
ble, rejecting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
5. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
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cuit’s conclusion that the bubble concept conflicted with the Clean Air Act’s
purpose to improve air quality.10
In reaching its conclusion, the Court established the bedrock two-step
test that is generally used when interpreting a statute administered by an
agency. Under so-called Chevron Step One, a court first consults the statu-
tory language to determine whether Congress has directly spoken on the
question at issue.11 If the court finds that the statute’s language is unambig-
uous, the court’s inquiry ends and the agency’s interpretation of the statu-
tory provision is therefore irrelevant.12 But, if there is an ambiguity in the
statute or if the statute is silent, the court applies Chevron Step Two and
decides whether the agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.”13 If reasonable, the agency’s interpretation is
controlling.14
B. A Brief Doctrinal Explanation
The Court in Chevron also set forth its basis for deferring to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute it administers.15 The Court explained that an
agency is empowered to “fill any gap”16 or resolve statutory ambiguities
because Congress’s grant of rulemaking authority to the agency creates the
presumption that the agency may “make all policy choices within its sphere
of delegated authority.”17 Because agencies possess greater political account-
ability than the judiciary,18 and also wield unique expertise and experience
to administer “technical and complex” regulatory programs,19 they are in the
best position to make difficult policy choices in circumstances where either
Congress “inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved
by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of
10. Id. at 845 (concluding that the EPA’s use of the bubble concept was a reasonable
policy choice). Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O’Connor did not take part in the decision.
Id. at 866.
11. Id. at 842.
12. Id. at 842–43.
13. Id. at 843.
14. Id. at 843–44.
15. Id. at 865.
16. Id. at 843.
17. Melanie E. Walker, Comment, Congressional Intent and Deference to Agency Interpre-
tations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (1999).
18. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the peo-
ple, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices . . . .”).
19. Id. (citing Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U.S.
380, 390 (1984)); see also Walker, supra note 17, at 1346–47.
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everyday realities.”20 Thus, Congress’s delegation to agencies not only
stems from the notion that “expert agencies are presumptively better than
generalist judges at construing statutory ambiguities,”21 but also because “a
reasonable legislator in the modern administrative state would rather give
law-interpreting power to agencies than the courts.”22
C. Chevron Step Zero
The Chevron test revolutionized the administrative state.23  In early it-
erations of the Chevron standard, the analysis was broadly applied to many
types of agency interpretations of statutes.24 But like most doctrines, the
Chevron analysis evolved. One significant evolution, which Professors Mer-
rill and Hickman identified in their seminal article, Chevron’s Domain, in-
volved three related principles that courts now use to determine whether
the Chevron analysis should apply in the first instance to resolve the inter-
pretive question.25 This threshold inquiry, which Merrill and Hickman
coined Chevron Step Zero, operates to define the scope of Chevron’s implied
delegation of interpretive power from Congress.26
The first of these questions requires the court to determine “what type
of power . . . Congress [must] confer upon an agency in order to trigger the
presumption that Congress has impliedly delegated interpretational author-
ity to the agency.”27 In other words, if deference under Chevron is based on
the view that Congress wanted a particular agency to fill in gaps in a partic-
ular statute, what signals that Congress has actually “charged” the agency
20. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66 (suggesting that an ambiguity or silence in the statute
may have been a result of Congress’s inability “to forge a coalition on either side of the
question”); see also Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 25 (2010).
21. Moncrieff, supra note 3, at 609.
22. Id. at 608.
23. Walker, supra note 17, at 1346 (“Chevron is one of the most widely discussed cases in
the academic literature . . . .”).
24. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116–17 (1989) (finding that the
Secretary of Labor’s view expressed in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and subsequent
regulation was entitled to Chevron deference); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844 (1986) (according Chevron deference to the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission’s “long-held position that it has the power to take jurisdiction over
counterclaims” in state reparation proceedings); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Phila. Gear
Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438–39 (1986) (holding that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion’s interpretation of a statutory provision was entitled to Chevron deference even though
not contained in a regulation).
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with such power?28 Assuming that the agency is properly charged, the sec-
ond inquiry determines the types of agency interpretations that are granted
Chevron deference.29 The third and final inquiry seeks to identify which
circumstances overcome the presumption that an agency has been granted
an implied delegation of interpretive authority.30
* * *
Chevron’s analytical framework thus now encompasses three distinct
steps. The resolution of the interpretive question and level of deference the
court gives to the agency hinges on the step at which the court ends its
inquiry: Step Zero (where it finds that the Chevron framework does not
apply, even if the statutory provision is ambiguous); Step One (where the
court determines that the statutory provision is unambiguous and therefore
applies its plain meaning); or Step Two (where the court defers to the
agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision).
II. THE ORIGINAL “MAJOR QUESTIONS” DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
As its name suggests, the major questions doctrine is invoked in statu-
tory construction cases that raise “major”—as opposed to “interstitial”—ques-
tions concerning significant aspects of the agency’s regulatory
28. Id.
29. Id. During the Supreme Court’s 2000–2001 term, a pair of Step Zero decisions
altered the Chevron framework. In 2000, the Court decided Christensen v. Harris County,
where it found that an agency’s statutory interpretation that was expressed in an informal
format, such as an opinion letter, did not warrant Chevron-style deference. 529 U.S. 576, 587
(2000). The following year, the Court decided United States v. Mead Corp., where it similarly
ruled a court should only grant an agency Chevron deference when the interpretation of a
statute is authorized by Congress and carries with it the force of law. 533 U.S. 218, 237
(2001) (“Chevron left Skidmore intact and applicable where statutory circumstances indicate
no intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where such author-
ity was not invoked . . . .”). Taken together, these rulings suggest that formal interpretations
should be entitled to Chevron deference and most informal interpretations should be re-
viewed under Skidmore’s less deferential standard. Id.
For example, as a general matter, (1) an agency that Congress has empowered to pro-
mulgate legislative rules receives deference for interpretations set forth in such rules; (2) an
agency that Congress has empowered to hold binding adjudications receives deference for
interpretations set forth in a final adjudication; and (3) an agency that Congress has empow-
ered to both render final adjudications and legislative rules may choose to set forth interpre-
tations that receive deference in either rulemaking or adjudications. Merrill & Hickman,
supra note 25, at 900–01.
30. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 25, at 873.
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responsibilities.31 Such aspects include whether the interpretive question
implicates the power or scope of the statutory scheme at issue, or where the
resolution of the interpretive question could effectuate an enormous and
transformative expansion in the agency’s regulatory authority.32 As set forth
below, the doctrine’s genesis can be traced back to two principal cases—MCI
and Brown & Williamson.
B. Phone Calls (MCI) and Tobacco (Brown & Williamson)
The Supreme Court first invoked the major questions doctrine in MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (MCI).33
Under the Communications Act of 1934, communications common carriers
are required to file tariffs with the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and then charge customers pursuant to those tariff rates.34 The Act
also authorizes the Commission to “modify” this requirement “in its discre-
tion and for good cause shown.”35 Under this authority, the FCC issued a
series of reports and orders in the 1980’s that relieved non-dominant long-
distance carriers from filing tariffs, leaving only AT&T subject to the filing
requirement.36
The Court was required to determine whether the FCC could permissi-
bly interpret “modify” to excuse the other carriers from filing tariffs.37 Al-
though it cited to Chevron in its opinion, the Court declared that “the
Commission’s permissive detariffing policy can be justified only if it makes
a less than radical or fundamental change in the Act’s tariff-filing
requirement.”38
31. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 231–34, 236–42
(2006) (discussing interstitial and major questions).
32. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (applying the doctrine
because the question at issue was “of deep ‘economic and political significance’” (quoting
UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014))); UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448 (applying the doctrine and
rejecting EPA’s interpretation because it “would also bring about an enormous and trans-
formative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authoriza-
tion.” (citing Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
160 (2000)); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994)
(applying the doctrine and finding it “highly unlikely” that Congress would entrust an “es-
sential characteristic” of the statutory scheme to agency discretion).
33. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 220; see also, Sunstein, supra note 31, at 236.
34. MCI, 512 U.S. at 220.
35. Id. at 224 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV)).
36. See id. at 221–22 (citing FCC reports and orders).
37. Id. at 220 (“These cases present the question whether the Commission’s decision to
make tariff filing optional for all nondominant long-distance carriers is a valid exercise of its
modification authority.”).
38. Id. at 229.
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In reviewing the FCC regulation, the Court found that “rate filings are
. . . the essential characteristic of a rate-regulated industry.”39 Furthermore,
the filing requirement “was Congress’s chosen means of preventing unrea-
sonableness and discrimination in charges”40 and had “always been consid-
ered essential to preventing price discrimination and stabilizing rates.”41 On
this basis, the Court concluded that it was “highly unlikely that Congress
would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or
even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion.”42 Moreover, it fur-
ther noted that it would be “even more unlikely that it would achieve that
through such a subtle device as permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing
requirements.”43
The Court held that the FCC’s regulation amounted to a “fundamental
revision of the statute, changing it from a scheme of rate regulation in long-
distance common-carrier communications to a scheme of rate regulation
only where effective competition does not exist.”44 It found “not the slight-
est doubt” concerning Congress’s intended meaning in the statute and
therefore rejected the FCC’s interpretation.45
Six years after MCI, the Court cemented the existence of the major
questions doctrine within the Chevron framework. In FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson, the Court faced the question of whether the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) had the authority to regulate tobacco products.46 In
1996, the FDA had determined that nicotine was a “drug” within the mean-
ing of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), and consequently issued
regulations aimed at reducing tobacco consumption among children and ad-
olescents.47 The FDA grounded its conclusion on the FDCA’s definition of
39. Id. at 231.
40. Id. at 230 (“There is not only a relation, but an indissoluble unity between the
provision for the establishment and maintenance of rates until corrected in accordance with
the statute and the prohibitions against preferences and discrimination.” (quoting Tex. &
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440 (1907))).
41. Id. (quoting Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 126
(1990)). The MCI Court also cited with approval a case which found “filing requirements
‘render rates definite and certain, and . . . prevent discrimination and other abuses,’ ” id.
(quoting Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 384 (1932)), and
that the “elimination of filing requirement ‘opens the door to the possibility of the very
abuses of unequal rates which it was the design of the statute to prohibit and punish,’ ” id.
(quoting Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 81 (1908)).
42. Id. at 231.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 231–32.
45. Id. at 228.
46. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125
(2000).
47. Id.
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“drug,” which included “articles (other than food) intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body.”48
The Court first identified that a “threshold issue [was to determine] the
appropriate framework for analyzing the FDA’s assertion of authority to
regulate tobacco products.”49 Because the dispute involved “an administra-
tive agency’s construction of a statute that it administers,” the Court’s re-
view was governed by Chevron Steps One and Two.50 Quoting Chevron, the
Court recognized that deference was warranted because “[t]he responsibili-
ties for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the strug-
gle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones.”51
However, the Court also noted that its application of Chevron was
cabined by other principles. The Court stated that its Step One analysis,
whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” was
impacted by the “nature of the question presented.”52 The Court pointed
out that Chevron deference is rooted in the principle that Congress implic-
itly delegated the agency authority to “fill in the statutory gaps.”53 But, “[i]n
extraordinary cases,” it explained, the Court will not presume that “Con-
gress has intended such an implicit delegation.”54
The Brown & Williamson Court then found that the case involved such
extraordinary circumstances. One principal rationale for this finding was
that the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction would extend to “a significant por-
tion of the American economy.”55 In support of this proposition, the Court
noted how a current U.S. Code provision stated that “the marketing of to-
bacco constitutes one of the greatest basic industries of the United States
with ramifying activities which directly affect interstate and foreign com-
merce at every point, and stable conditions therein are necessary to the
general welfare.”56 The Court noted that its reasoning in MCI was “instruc-
48. Id. at 126 (quoting 21 U.S.C § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. III)).
49. Id. at 132.
50. Id. (reciting Chevron’s two-step analysis).
51. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984)). The Court also noted that deference was appropriate based on the “agency’s
greater familiarity with the ever-changing facts and circumstances surrounding the subjects
regulated.” Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991)).
52. Id. at 159.
53. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
54. Id. (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) (“A court may also ask whether the legal question is an important
one. Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while
leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily
administration.”)).
55. Id. (“This is hardly an ordinary case.”).
56. Id. at 137 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994)).
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tive.”57 As in MCI, the Court was “confident that Congress could not have
intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance
to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”58 It therefore concluded that Congress
had “directly spoken to the issue and precluded the FDA from regulating
tobacco products.”59
C. MCI, Brown & Williamson, and Chevron Step One
These two early cases established the major questions doctrine as part
of the statutory interpretation inquiry within the Chevron framework. In
both MCI and Brown & Williamson, the Court applied the doctrine within
Chevron’s Step One analysis.
For instance, in Brown & Williamson, the Court characterized its hold-
ing in MCI as falling under Step One: “We rejected the FCC’s construction,
finding ‘not the slightest doubt’ that Congress had directly spoken to the
question.”60 Likewise, in Brown & Williamson, the Court concluded that the
FDA did not have authority over tobacco products because “Congress ha[d]
directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” a Step One inquiry.61
Thus, in its original form, the major questions doctrine constituted a
narrow expansion of the Chevron framework whereby the Court, in its Chev-
ron Step One analysis, measured the degree to which the issue at hand was
“major” to help determine whether the statutory language was plain and
unambiguous.
III. MAJOR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE “MAJOR QUESTIONS”
DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
After its emergence in cases such as MCI and Brown & Williamson, the
Court clearly embraced the major questions doctrine as part of its working
“toolkit” for statutory construction. With respect to the doctrine, several
observations can be made. First, in key cases such as MCI and Brown &
Williamson, the Court invoked the doctrine as part of its Chevron Step One
inquiry.62 But perhaps because the doctrine was only in its infancy, the
Court did not engage in a discussion or elaboration of its contours. Nor was
there any mention of how the major questions doctrine fit within the Chev-
57. Id. at 160.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 160–61.
60. Id. at 160 (quoting MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
228 (1994)).
61. Id. at 159.
62. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 227.
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ron analysis or whether it should be applied exclusively at Chevron Step
One.
Second, since its decision in Brown & Williamson in 2000, the Court has
declined to invoke the doctrine in cases where justices, litigants, and schol-
ars have argued it would be appropriate to do so.63 For example, in the
Court’s groundbreaking decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, where the Court
held that greenhouse gases were “pollutants” under the Clean Air Act, the
major questions doctrine took center stage in the majority opinion.64 In that
case, EPA had argued that its interpretation that the Clean Air Act did not
authorize the regulation of greenhouse gases was consistent with Brown &
Williamson (and the major questions doctrine) because based on the eco-
nomic and political significance of the decision, Congress could not have
intended EPA to regulate greenhouse gases.65 In finding against EPA, how-
ever, the Court expressly explained why EPA’s reliance on Brown & Wil-
liamson was misplaced.66 Following the Court’s opinion, scholars opined
that the Court’s decision was incorrect on that basis.67
Third, when the Court revived the major questions doctrine in 2014
and 2015, it did so in circumstances outside the Chevron Step One analysis.
The re-emergence of the doctrine is a significant event within our adminis-
trative jurisprudence, and its application beyond the Step One inquiry
raises separate concerns. Accordingly, this Part explores the evolution of the
major questions doctrine in the recent cases of UARG68 and King69 and
analyzes inconsistencies in the Court’s current approach.
B. UARG v. EPA
The major questions doctrine awoke from its dormancy in a majority
opinion in the Supreme Court’s decision in UARG. The doctrine provided
pivotal support for the Court’s decision to reject EPA’s interpretation of a
Clean Air Act provision involving the regulation of greenhouse gases
63. Moncrieff, supra note 3, at 594 (arguing that the Court should have applied the
major questions doctrine in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)); see also City of
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (rejecting distinguishing between “big, im-
portant” agency interpretations and “humdrum, run-of-the-mill” interpretations when decid-
ing whether to defer under Chevron); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 530–31 (rejecting EPA’s
arguments that the major questions doctrine should apply in interpreting the statute to pre-
clude regulation).
64. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 530–31.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Moncrieff, supra note 3, at 594.
68. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
69. Id. at 2480.
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(GHGs).70 The case involved challenges to EPA’s “cascading series of
greenhouse gas-related rules and regulations” promulgated in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s 2007 conclusion in Massachusetts v. EPA that GHGs
may be regulated under the CAA.71 After Massachusetts v. EPA, one pivotal
question remained: whether EPA’s promulgation of GHG emission stan-
dards for new motor vehicles compelled the agency to regulate certain “sta-
tionary sources” of GHG emissions, such as power plants, industrial
facilities, and even smaller sources, like apartment buildings.72 Relatedly,
even if EPA was not required to regulate these stationary sources, the ques-
tion remained whether it was nonetheless permitted to do so under the Clean
Air Act.
The Court in UARG answered these questions in a divided and complex
decision.73 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito, described the case as consisting of “two dis-
tinct challenges.”74 First, the Court was required to “decide whether EPA
permissibly determined that a source may be subject to [certain CAA] per-
mitting requirements on the sole basis of the source’s potential to emit
greenhouse gases.”75 Second, the Court needed to assess whether EPA “per-
missibly determined that a source already subject to the [CAA permitting] pro-
gram because of its emission of conventional pollutants . . . may be required
to limit its greenhouse-gas emissions by” installing certain pollution reduc-
ing devices.76
To answer the first question, the Court proceeded through three sepa-
rate inquiries77: (1) whether EPA’s view was compelled by the statute;78 (2)
if not compelled, whether EPA’s view was a reasonable construction of the
CAA;79 and (3) if not reasonable, whether EPA’s promulgation of a related
CAA rule could cure the unreasonable interpretation.80
70. Id. For a comprehensive examination of the case, see Kevin O. Leske, A Step by Step
Look at UARG v. EPA: A New Layer of Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 4 ENVTL. & EARTH L.J. 3
(2014).
71. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
72. Leske, supra note 70, at 3.
73. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2430–32.
74. Id. at 2438.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 2447 (discussing the permissibility of require-
ments EPA placed on sources already subject to the CAA permitting program).
77. Id. at 2439–47.
78. Id. at 2439–42 (Part II-A-1).
79. Id. at 2442–44 (Part II-A-2).
80. Id. at 2444–46 (Part II-A-3).
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first set forth that the Court
would follow the Chevron standard. Under Chevron Step One, the Court
inquired whether, under the plain language of the CAA, a source not other-
wise regulated because of its emissions of conventional pollutants must be
subject to applicable permitting requirements based solely on its potential
to emit greenhouse gasses.81 On this issue, the Court rejected EPA’s posi-
tion that the CAA was unambiguous and held that the statute did not com-
pel such a result.82 In other words, there was “no insuperable textual
barrier” in the CAA preventing EPA from excluding GHG emissions as a
permitting trigger.83
Because the Court rejected EPA’s plain language argument, it turned to
Chevron Step Two to determine whether EPA’s interpretation that the CAA
could be construed to regulate “anyway” sources was nonetheless reasona-
ble.84 The major questions doctrine was invoked in this part of the Court’s
analysis.85 Despite recognizing that Chevron’s deferential framework permit-
ted EPA to “operate ‘within the bounds of reasonable interpretation,’ ”86
the majority rejected EPA’s construction of the CAA. The Court explained
that its analysis of the proper interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term
is guided by “the specific context in which . . . language is used” as well as
“the broader context of the statute as a whole.”87 In other words, “an agency
interpretation that is ‘inconsisten[t] with the design and structure of the
statute as a whole,’ does not merit deference.”88
The Court then rejected EPA’s interpretation as “inconsistent with . . .
the [Clean Air] Act’s structure and design.”89 The Court highlighted that
EPA had “repeatedly acknowledged that applying the [relevant CAA] per-
mitting requirements to greenhouse gases would be inconsistent with—in
fact, would overthrow—the Act’s structure and design.”90 EPA’s interpreta-
tion would lead to an incredible rise in permit applications, billions of dol-
lars in administrative costs, and “decade-long delays” that would cause
81. Id. at 2438–39. The Court called these “non-anyway sources,” in contrast to “any-
way sources,” which are stationary sources already regulated because of their emissions of
conventional pollutants. Id.
82. Id. at 2442.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2444.
86. Id. at 2442 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)).
87. Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
88. Id. at 2442 (alteration in original) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2529 (2013)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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“construction projects to grind to a halt nationwide.”91 The Court cited to
EPA’s own admission that including smaller sources would result in a “com-
plicated, resource-intensive, time-consuming, and sometimes contentious
process.”92
In addition to the practical implications of EPA’s interpretation, the
Court reasoned that including smaller stationary sources would contravene
Congress’s intent.93 The Court surmised that Congress, in designing the
permitting programs at issue, intended to cover “a relative handful of large
sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.”94
Thus, Congress would have wanted the program to apply to “ ‘hundreds of
larger sources,’ not ‘tens of thousands of smaller sources.’ ”95 Even EPA had
conceded that one of the permitting programs at issue was “ ‘finely crafted
for thousands,’ not millions, of sources.”96 An interpretation that allowed
EPA to mandate that smaller sources secure permits for their GHG emis-
sions alone would therefore “be ‘incompatible’ with ‘the substance of Con-
gress’ [sic] regulatory scheme.’”97
After determining that EPA’s interpretation was incompatible with the
regulatory scheme, the Court concluded that the major questions doctrine
also compelled the conclusion that EPA’s interpretation was unreasonable
under Chevron Step Two.98 EPA’s interpretation that GHG emissions alone
91. Id. at 2442–43. For example, EPA had conceded that applications for PSD permits
would balloon from approximately 800 to about 82 thousand each year. Id. at 2443 (citing
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,557 (June 3, 2010)). Similarly, the administrative costs
of the PSD program would skyrocket from $12 million to over $1.5 billion. Id. With respect
to the Title V program, the Court called the consequences “equally bleak” if sources were
required to secure permits based on the potential GHG emissions. Id. Permits would be
required for over 6 million sources (up from about 15 thousand sources) and administrative
costs would rise from $62 million to $21 billion annually. Id. (citing Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. at 31,562–63). And even more dramatically, “collectively the newly covered sources
would face permitting costs of $147 billion.” Id.
92. Id. (quoting Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,304, 55,321–22 (proposed Oct.
27, 2009)).
93. Id. (“[T]he great majority of additional sources brought into the PSD and title V
programs would be small sources that Congress did not expect would need to undergo per-
mitting.” (quoting Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,533)).
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 55,304, 55,321–22).
96. Id. at 2444 (quoting Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,563).
97. Id. at 2443 (quoting Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 156 (2000)). For instance, the majority quoted EPA’s admission that inclusion
of GHGs as a regulated pollutant under PSD and Title programs would result in a 1,000-
fold increase in the statutory permitting thresholds and would therefore “severely undermine
what Congress sought to accomplish.” Id. at 2443 (quoting Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at
31,554).
98. Id. at 2444.
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could trigger CAA permitting requirements, it concluded, “would bring
about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory au-
thority without clear congressional authorization.”99 The Court cited both
Brown & Williamson and MCI for the proposition that in circumstances
where an agency’s interpretation impacts “a significant portion of the Amer-
ican economy,” courts must be wary to endorse such an interpretation with-
out clear direction by Congress.100 EPA’s admission that its interpretation
would transform the CAA into a statute that would be “unrecognizable to
the Congress that designed it” further reinforced the conclusion that EPA’s
view was unreasonable.101 Thus, the Court found that the agency’s interpre-
tation fell “comfortably”102 within the category of interpretations that “do[ ]
not merit deference.”103
The second issue presented in the case was whether EPA “permissibly
determined that a source already subject to the [CAA permitting] program be-
cause of its emission of conventional pollutants (an ‘anyway source’) may
be required to limit its greenhouse-gas emissions” by having to install cer-
tain pollution reducing devices.104 The provision at issue required that the
best available control technology (BACT) be applied “for each pollutant
subject to regulation” under the CAA.105  Here, the Court concluded its
Step One analysis in favor of the EPA, holding that the BACT provision
unambiguously applies to GHG emissions from “anyway sources.”106
With respect to the major questions doctrine, the Court further ex-
plained that even if the plain text of the provision did not compel the
Court’s conclusion, there was no practical problem that would render EPA’s
interpretation unreasonable under Chevron Step Two.107 In other words, the
major questions doctrine would not apply because EPA’s interpretation was
not “so disastrously unworkable” as to “result in such a dramatic expansion
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting and citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159, 160) (citing MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994); Indus. Union Dept.,
AFL–CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645–46 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
101. Id. at 2442, 2444 (noting in its Chevron Step One analysis that it would have been
entirely consistent with the CAA (and the Court’s decision in Massachusetts) for EPA “to
exclude those atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quanti-
ties that their inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them unwork-
able as written”).
102. Id. at 2444.
103. Id. at 2442.
104. Id. at 2438 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2447 (discussing the permissibility of
requirements EPA placed on sources already subject to the CAA permitting program).
105. Id. at 2448.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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of agency authority” or “extend[ ] EPA jurisdiction over millions of previ-
ously unregulated entities.”108 Rather, the interpretation would merely
“moderately increas[e] the demands EPA (or a state permitting authority)
can make of entities already subject to its regulation.”109 Moreover, the
Court found that it was not clear that “EPA’s demands will be of a signifi-
cantly different character from those traditionally associated with” the re-
quirements to which such sources are already subject.110 Thus, the Court
twice addressed the major questions doctrine in its Chevron Step Two analy-
sis, but with different results.111
C. King v. Burwell
A year after UARG, the Court invoked the major questions doctrine
again in King. This time, it did at so at Chevron Step Zero, thereby declining
to apply the Chevron framework altogether.
At issue in King112 was a provision of the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) concerning tax credits available to individuals.113 The
ACA’s goal is to provide universal health care. In furtherance of this goal,
the ACA instituted a series of health insurance reforms applicable to all
states.114 The first reform was to enact health insurance market regulations
that “barred insurers from denying coverage to any person because of his
health” (the “guaranteed issue” requirement) and prohibited “insurers from
charging a person higher premiums for the same reason” (the “community
rating” requirement).115
The second reform requires that individuals secure health insurance
coverage or face an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) penalty (the “coverage
requirement”).116 To ensure that individuals would not wait to buy health
insurance until they became ill, Congress enacted this coverage mandate to
“minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2449.
111. Id. at 2444, 2448–49.
112. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
113. Id. at 2485 (2015); The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.).
114. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485.
115. Id. at 2485–86 (“[E]ach health insurance issuer that offers health insurance cover-
age in the individual . . . market in a State must accept every . . . individual in the State that
applies for such coverage.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–1(a) (2012))). The Court found that
“[t]he Act also bars insurers from charging higher premiums on the basis of a person’s
health.” Id.
116. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012)).
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to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance
premiums.”117
The third reform provides tax credits to low income individuals to
make health coverage more affordable. For instance, “individuals with
household incomes between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal pov-
erty line” are eligible for such tax credits and are allowed to use these credits
to buy insurance directly from to the individual’s insurer in advance.118
To effectuate these reforms, the ACA also requires each state to create
an “Exchange” for individuals to shop for health insurance coverage.119 If a
state decides not to establish an Exchange, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) “shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange
within the State.”120
The question in King was “whether the Act’s tax credits are available in
States that have a Federal Exchange rather than a State Exchange.”121 Al-
though the ACA states that tax credits “shall be allowed” for any “applicable
taxpayer,” it also provides that the tax credit amount depends in part on the
taxpayer’s enrollment in a health insurance plan through “an Exchange es-
tablished by the State under section 1311 of the [ACA].”122
The IRS interpreted the provision to mean that individuals were eligi-
ble for credits when insurance was purchased in either a State or a Federal
Exchange.123 Specifically, the IRS rule determined tax credit eligibility
based on enrollment in an insurance plan through “an Exchange,”124 which
is further defined as “an Exchange serving the individual market . . . regard-
less of whether the Exchange is established and operated by a State . . . or
by HHS.”125
The parties challenging the IRS interpretation, on the other hand,
maintained that tax credits were not available for individuals who enrolled
in insurance plans through a Federal Exchange. They argued that based on
the statute, a Federal Exchange is not “an Exchange established by the State
under [42 U.S.C. § 18031].”126
117. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2012)). The act exempts the coverage re-
quirement for an individual who “has to spend more than eight percent of his income on
health insurance.” Id. at 2486–87 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B)(ii)).
118. Id. at 2487 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081, 18082 (2012)).
119. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012)).
120. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012)).
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a)–(c) (2012) (emphasis added)).
123. Id. (citing Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,378 (May 23,
2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 602)).
124. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2 (2013)).
125. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2014)).
126. Id. at 2488.
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A circuit split resulted as to the applicability of tax credits. The Fourth
Circuit interpreted the ACA as “ambiguous and subject to at least two dif-
ferent interpretations.”127 It then granted deference to the IRS under Chev-
ron Step Two.128 In a separate challenge, the D.C. Circuit struck down the
IRS Rule, holding under Chevron Step One that the ACA “unambiguously
restricts” the tax credits to state Exchanges.129
The Supreme Court, diverging from the reasoning of both Circuits,
found for the first time that the application of the major questions doctrine
rendered the Chevron analysis inapplicable in this case.130 It first acknowl-
edged that the Court “often” applies the Chevron two-step framework,
which “is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an
implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory
gaps.”131 But, the Court quoted its opinion in Brown & Williamson, explain-
ing that “[i]n extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before
concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.”132 Be-
cause the issues at stake in King were, according to the Court, of such “ex-
traordinary” significance, the Court found that Congress had not
empowered either HHS or the IRS to receive Chevron deference for its
interpretation of the ACA.133 The Court indicated that it was especially
wary of implying such a delegation to the IRS, in particular, because the
agency “has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”134
The Court explained that the eligibility for tax credits was a key feature
of the ACA that affects “billions of dollars in spending each year” as well as
“the price of health insurance for millions of people.”135 Quoting UARG, the
Court found that availability of such credits on the Federal Exchange was
therefore “a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is
central to this statutory scheme.”136 Thus, the Court asserted, if Congress
had wanted an agency to resolve such a significant issue, it would have
expressly indicated so.137
127. Id. (quoting King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 372 (4th Cir. 2014)).
128. Id. (citing King, 759 F.3d at 377).
129. Id. (quoting Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
130. Id. at 2489.
131. Id. at 2488 (citing Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
132. Id. at 2488–89 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).
133. Id. at 2489.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
137. Id. at 2489. The Court also opined that it was “especially unlikely that Congress
would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health
insurance policy of this sort.” Id. (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266–67 (2006)).
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Rather than apply Chevron’s deferential standard, therefore, the Court
determined that it must itself “determine the correct reading” of the tax
credit provision.138 The Court reasoned that “[i]f the statutory language is
plain, [the Court] must enforce it according to its terms.”139 To determine
whether the plain language resolved the question, the Court looked to the
provision’s words in context and the “overall statutory scheme.”140 In other
words, the Court made clear that its duty was “to construe statutes, not
isolated provisions.”141 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the ACA “al-
lows tax credits for insurance purchased on any Exchange created under the
Act.”142
D. The Major Questions Doctrine and the Chevron Analysis
Contrasting the Court’s application of the major questions doctrine in
MCI and Brown & Williamson with the Court’s application in recent cases
such as UARG and King demonstrates that the Court has shifted its ap-
proach in applying the Chevron framework. Moreover, the varied ap-
proaches cannot be easily reconciled with one another, raising questions
about how the major questions doctrine will be applied in future cases.
For instance, in UARG, the Court rejected EPA’s interpretation by ap-
plying the major questions doctrine at Chevron Step Two.143 The question
remains, why didn’t the Court follow MCI or Brown & Williamson to find
that EPA’s interpretation was foreclosed by the plain language of the CAA
at Step One? To be sure, the ACA provision appeared ambiguous. If the
Court had applied the major questions doctrine in its analysis of Chevron
Step One, like it did in Brown & Williamson, the Court could have reached
the same result.
In Brown & Williamson, the Court found that the “meaning—or ambigu-
ity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context”144 and that when engaging in a plain language analysis, the Court
reads the provisions “in their context and with a view to their place in the
138. Id. at 2489.
139. Id. (citing Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010)).
140. Id. at 2489 (quoting Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
141. Id. at 2489 (quoting Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010)).
142. Id. at 2496.
143. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
144. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118
(1994)).
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overall statutory scheme.”145 This approach would have supported a finding
that the plain language foreclosed EPA’s interpretation under Chevron Step
One based on the significant impact EPA’s interpretation would have had
on the economy, as well as the conflict with the overall CAA statutory
scheme of the CAA (that EPA conceded).146
Additionally, the application of the doctrine in UARG is questionable in
light of the Court’s subsequent analysis in King. Given the UARG Court’s
conclusion that EPA’s interpretation “would bring about an enormous and
transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear con-
gressional authorization,”147 why didn’t the Court find the Chevron frame-
work inapplicable and instead task itself with “determin[ing] the correct
reading” of the provision, like it did in King?148 In fact, in both UARG and
King the Court cited Brown & Williamson for the proposition that where
major questions are involved, courts should look for express or clear indica-
tions of Congress’s intent that the agency should resolve such questions.149
What therefore accounts for the Chevron framework being applicable in
UARG, but not in King?
It could be that King represents the anomaly. The Court in King pro-
vides no obvious justification for dispensing with the Chevron framework
altogether based on the “extraordinary” importance of the issue.150 For in-
stance, it did not indicate that the issue presented was more important or
more exceptional than the questions raised in other major questions cases,
such as UARG or Brown & Williamson, in order to explain why the Chevron
framework would not apply. Indeed, the opinion appears to conflict with
the Court’s 2013 decision in City of Arlington v. FCC, where the Court re-
jected the distinction between “big, important” agency interpretations and
“humdrum, run-of-the-mill” interpretations when deciding whether to defer
under Chevron.151
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the King Court could have applied
the Chevron framework and the major questions doctrine simultaneously to
reach the result that it did, as in MCI, Brown & Williamson, and UARG. As
scholars have observed, the King Court could have reached the same result
145. Id. at 133 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989));
see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
146. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
147. Id.
148. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
149. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159); King, 135
S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133).
150. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
151. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
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as it did under either of the Chevron steps.152 For instance, under Chevron
Step One, the King Court could have determined that the plain language of
the statute permits tax credits under either state or federal exchanges. Echo-
ing the reasoning in its Chevron Step One analysis in Brown & Williamson,
the Court could have read the tax credit provision “in [its] context and with
a view to [its] place in the overall statutory scheme.”153 In fact, the King
Court cited Brown & Williamson when explaining how it would undertake
its own independent analysis.154 Thus, its failure to apply the Chevron
framework is puzzling. Similarly, the Court could have found the statute to
be ambiguous and then upheld the IRS interpretation, which accorded with
its own reading of the statute, as reasonable under Chevron Step Two.
Will King stand for the proposition that invocation of the major ques-
tions doctrine now precludes application of the Chevron framework? Or will
the Court continue to apply Chevron on an ad hoc basis notwithstanding the
simultaneous application of the major questions doctrine? The doctrine’s re-
emergence leaves such questions unresolved, calling for further study by
scholars and a meaningful reconsideration by the Court to help bring clarity
to this important issue of administrative law.
CONCLUSION
The major questions doctrine is back and here to stay. Standing alone,
it raises legitimate doctrinal, pragmatic, and constitutional concerns. First,
when the Court applies the doctrine, it diminishes the deference that an
agency normally receives, thereby shifting interpretive authority to the
courts. In the extreme case where, upon invoking the doctrine, the Court
declines to apply the Chevron framework at all, this effectuates a significant
transfer of power from agencies to the judiciary.
Second, as scholars have also argued, significant questions arise when
courts decide whether to invoke the doctrine, given its practical conse-
quences. For instance, how do courts determine which cases involve “major
questions,” a decision that then alters the traditional deferential frame-
work?155 And when courts determine that a case involves a major question,
152. See Jody Freeman, The Chevron Sidestep, HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROGRAM
(June 25, 2015), http://environment.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/the-chevron-sidestep/.
153. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury,
489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)); see also King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
154. Id.
155. Moncrieff, supra note 3, at 611–12; see also Loshin & Nielson, supra note 20, at 45
(major questions are “in the eye of the beholder”).
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how does this impact their ultimate resolution of the interpretive question
at issue?156
Third, the application of the major questions doctrine undermines the
Chevron framework itself, as well as implicates separation of powers con-
cerns. Deference to agencies under Chevron is premised on the assumption
that Congress intended to delegate interpretative authority to agencies.157
Invoking the doctrine where significant policy questions are at issue thereby
shifts power from the executive branch to the judiciary to “make policy.”158
Fourth, as a matter of doctrine, when courts assess whether the case
involves an issue that would work a transformative shift in the agency’s
power or would create a fundamental change in the statute, it creates a
“tension with textualism.”159 In other words, the purposivist approach used
to assess whether a case involves a major question “collides into the insights
of textualist theory, which says that often statutory ‘schemes’ have no sin-
gle purpose.”160 Thus, the doctrine is difficult to reconcile with a leading
theory of statutory interpretation.
The expanded invocation of the major questions doctrine during the
statutory construction analysis raises additional concerns. Analyzing the
original application of the major questions doctrine in MCI and Brown &
Williamson, as well as the Court’s changing application in recent cases such
as UARG and King, demonstrates that the Court now applies the doctrine at
(1) Chevron Step One; (2) Chevron Step Two; and (3) Chevron Step Zero
(thereby sidestepping the Chevron framework altogether). These recent ap-
plications have resulted in an unpredictable framework for statutory con-
struction, one that could undermine the goals of consistency, fairness, and
transparency in our administrative state.161 The ultimate impact of this lack
of uniformity remains to be seen, but, all told, major questions remain about
the “major questions” doctrine.
156. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 20, at 45 (arguing that the “zone of possible disagree-
ment expands” when courts look to statutory purpose to determine whether the major ques-
tions doctrine applies).
157. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 846 (1984).
158. Moncrieff, supra note 3, at 612–13 (arguing that the “majorness exception violates
Chevron’s theory of institutional capacity, empowering judges relative to agencies in the in-
terpretation of ‘major’ questions”).
159. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 20, at 49.
160. Id. That is, “[h]ow can a court decide what is ‘fundamental’ and what is ‘ancillary,’
if there is no one purpose that explains each specific provision of the statute?” Id. at 51.
161. Id. at 45 (arguing that “the doctrine cannot be applied in a consistent fashion”);
Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1137, 1174–75 (2014).
